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Abstract 
We examine conditions under which a platform firm can exclude 
rivals by bundling a product that some on one side of the market regard 
as essential with its platform, and pursue implications for market 
performance. We show that the impact of an exclusive dealing contract 
between the upstream firm and one of the downstream firms on market 
performance depends on the strength of consumer preferences for the 
products of the two downstream Firms and the relative size of the 
market segment for which the complementary consumption good is 
essential. In some cases this may reduce the net social welfare. 
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1 Introduction
We model a platform market in which a portion of agents on one side of
the market require that a complementary good be supplied to be willing to
transact on the platform. We show that if the fraction of such agents is su¢ -
ciently great, an exclusive dealing arrangement between one platform and the
supplier of the complementary good can make rival platforms unprotable,
excluding them from the market, although they would not be excluded (and
consumer welfare and net social welfare would improve, under some circum-
stances), absent the exclusive dealing arrangement. We also nd conditions
under which this exclusion can be welfare improving.
Our stylized model is exemplied by a real-world episode from the Dal-
las, Texas newspaper market.1 The newspaper industry is a prototypical
example of a platform market. It can be modelled as involving four sets of
players: newspapers, readers, advertisers and press syndicates. Newspapers
are platforms, with readers and advertisers as the two interacting groups. A
newspaper commonly publishes features, articles, comics, puzzles, etc., along
with news and advertisements. Newspaper employees prepare some published
material; the remainder is purchased from press syndicates. Press syndicates
are upstream rms that sell specialized material to newspapers; they are not
news wire services. Some press syndicates specialize in the distribution of
comic strips, acting as agents for cartoonists, often under exclusive territorial
contracts.
On August 2,1989, the Dallas Morning News (Morning News) signed an
exclusive contract for 26 columns and comic strips provided by the Universal
Press Syndicate, o¤erings that had until that time been available through the
Dallas Times Herald (Times Herald). The two newspapers had competed
for more than a century. Universal Syndicate conceded that it thought the
move was predatory, but that the cancellations were required by its contract
with the Morning News. The Times Herald su¤ered a circulation loss of 9,000
10,000 in weekday and 15,000 in Sunday circulation, and led an antitrust
lawsuit asking for $33 million in actual damages and up to three times of
that amount in punitive damages against the Morning News and its parent
company.
1See the Appeals Court decision in Times Herald Printing Co. v. A. H. Belo Cor-
poration et al. (Court of Appeals of Texas, Fourteenth District) 820 S.W.2d 206; 1991
Tex. App. LEXIS 2899; 335-66 Trade Cas. (CCH) P69, 680 (1991). Also see Gelsanliter
(1995).
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A state judge in Texas refused to grant the Times Herald a preliminary
injunction to prevent the movement of the syndicated features, on the ground
that the Times Herald could be supplied with substitute syndicated features
by competing syndicates. The Times Herald subsequently lost a District
Court jury trial and an appeal of the District Court outcome. However, the
Morning News paid $1.5 million to the Times Herald as part of an outside
settlement. The Times Herald did not recapture its lost reader base and
advertising revenue. The Morning Newsparent corporation purchased the
Times Herald on December 8, 1991 and stopped its publication the next day.2
A similar episode occurred in the U.S. television industry. Project Run-
way, a reality show based on fashion design, was shown by the Bravo Network
from 2004 to 2008. On July 2006 the shows producers made an exclusive
deal to move the show to Lifetime Television starting from 2009. Litigation
followed, and was privately settled after Bravo Network prevailed in early
stages. Bravo Network subsequently launched a competing program (The
Fashion Show), which enjoyed about one-quarter Project Runways num-
ber of viewers, and correspondingly less advertising revenue. The switch of
Project Runway to a rival network has the potential to exclude the Bravo
Network from the market.3
Some other examples of this setting are the killer appavailable only on
a single platform; see Viecens (2009), who notes tendency of rms which
operate software platforms to integrate with so-called killer applications.
An exclusive license, in this perspective, is a form of contractual integration.
We model a vertically-structured two-sided market. An upstream rm
provides what for some consumers is an essential complementary consump-
2The rise of the internet has made print media a declining industry. Our stylized
model is not meant to imply that the Morning News exclusive arrangement with the
United Press Syndicate was the unique factor responsible for the demise of the Times
Herald. The general increase in concentration in the newspaper markets of US cities, and
the corresponding reasons and consequences are discussed in Bucklin et al. (1989) and
Genesove (2003). But the fact that the Times Heralds otherwise unsuccessful legal action
resulted in a $1.5 million private settlement is consistent with the view that the exclusive
arrangement was one factor in the demise of the Times Herald.
3See New York Supreme Court case 601011-2008, NBC Universal, Inc. and Bravo Media
Llc. v. Weinstein Co. Llc., Defendant-Intervenor: Lifetime Entertainment Services; Hu¤,
Richard Project Runwayquits Bravo for Lifetime,NYDailyNews.com 7 April 2008;
Lafayette, Jon NBCU wins round in Project Runway, TVWeek.com, 26 September
2008; Associated Press, Project Runwayis cleared for move to Lifetime from Bravo,1
April 2009.
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tion good4 to two downstream rms that supply di¤erentiated platforms to
two sides of the nal market. We show that the impact of an exclusive deal-
ing contract between the upstream rm and one of the downstream rms on
market performance depends on the strength of consumer preferences for the
products of the two downstream rms and the relative size of the market
segment for which the complementary consumption good is essential. We
show that for strong preferences about the views expressed in a newspaper
(which we model as transportation costin a Hotelling framework), and a
su¢ ciently large fraction of the population that regards comics as an essential
component of a newspaper can exclude the unlicensed rm from the market.
If readerspreferences are pronounced, an exclusive contract can also leave
the market with a fraction of buyers who do not purchase any newspaper.5
In Section 2 we review the parts of the literature on two-sided markets
most closely related to the present study. Section 3 contains the setup of the
model, describing assumptions about readers, advertisers, and newspapers.
In Section 4, we present results for the monopoly case. Section 5 contains
the basic model. In Section 6 we extend the basic model of reader demand to
the case in which some consumers regard syndicate-supplied material as an
essential component of a newspaper and characterize equilibrium outcomes.
Section 7 discusses equilibrium licensing behavior, and Section 8 examines
the welfare consequences of an exclusionary exclusive license. Section 9 con-
cludes. Proofs are given in the Appendix.
2 Related Literature
2.1 Two-sided Markets
Rochet and Tirole (2006) dene a two-sided market as a special type of
market in which there are two distinct user groups of a particular platform(a
product or a service) and the users benet from the capacity of the platform
to connect the two user groups. The platform is able to charge distinct
4The essential componentaspect of features evolves through habit formation of news-
paper readers. See Argentesi (2004).
5These results are obtained in a model of a market where there is a single supplier
of an essential complementary good. Qualitatively similar results will obtain if there are
multiple suppliers of vertically-di¤erentiated varieties of the complementary good and one
is perceived by consumers to be of markedly higher quality than the others. It is essential
for exclusionary e¤ect that consumers regard the complementary good as essential.
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prices to the two user groups. Examples of this type of market include credit
cards, travel agencies, video games, personal computer operating systems,
and newspapers. There is a large theoretical literature on two-sided markets,6
and here we limit our discussion to the parts of this literature that are directly
related to our work.
There are several kinds of markets (newspapers, television channels, credit
cards) in which platforms compete as oligopolists to supply the same to user
groups. Rochet and Tirole (2003) introduce a general model of platform
competition (closely related to the credit card market) and show how prices
and end-user surpluses are determined. In a platform duopoly, end users have
to decide whether to transact with only one or with both platforms. Since the
decision of end users on one side of the market a¤ects the incentives of end
users on the other side of the market, end users face a tradeo¤. We can use
Rochet and Tiroles results to justify the assumption that if consumers single
home,reading at most one of all available newspapers, then advertisers will
advertise on both newspapers.
Caillaud and Jullien (2003) deal with the chicken-egg problem7 in an
intermediate service market. They build a model of imperfect competition
among intermediaries and analyze e¢ cient allocations and pricing strategies.
When users use only one of two intermediaries (the case of single homing),
the e¢ cient allocation is one where all users join the same intermediary. If
users are allowed to join both intermediaries, all users are willing to join both
intermediaries and the optimal pricing strategy of platforms is to charge a
transaction fee rather than a registration fee.
The extensive literature that follows Rochet and Tirole (2003) analyzes
di¤erent aspects of competition in platform markets. We adapt the basic
model of Armstrong (2006) to analyze one type of exclusionary conduct in a
two-sided market.
Armstrong (2006) develops three related models of two-sided markets: a
monopoly platform, a model of single-homing and a model of competitive bot-
tlenecks (similar to the multi-homing model of Caillaud and Jullien, 2003).
In the competitive bottlenecks scenario, platforms compete for a group of
single-homing users (Armstrong, 2006, p. 679):
6See Rochet and Tirole (2002) and Schmalensee (2002) for applications of models of
two-sided markets to the credit card industry, and Rochet and Tirole (2006) and Rysman
(2009) for comprehensive surveys of the literature.
7This is that failure to capture one side of the market results in losing the other side,
regardless of the prices o¤ered.
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Here, if it wishes to interact with an agent on the single-homing
side, the multi-homing side has no choice but to deal with that
agents chosen platform. Thus, platforms have monopoly power
over providing access to their single-homing customers for the
multi-homing side.
Using a similar structure, Armstrong and Wright (2007) consider a model
of two-sided markets where each side of the market has a di¤erent level of
product di¤erentiation. Asymmetric product di¤erentiation, if exists, causes
competitive bottlenecks in the market.
2.2 Exclusion in Two-Sided Markets
Church and Gandal (2004) argue that the direct denial of compatibility, and
the restriction of the compatibility of complementary products, are exclu-
sionary in the telecommunications industry. Nocke et al. (2007) show that
exclusion can reduce welfare if platform e¤ects are weak, but that if platform
size is large, exclusion can improve welfare. Hagiu and Lee (2009), Weeds
(2009) and Stennek (2007) discuss exclusionary e¤ects of exclusive contracts
between distributors and TV channels. They also argue that exclusive con-
tracts may be welfare improving.
The case of an essential commodity in consumer demand is little discussed
in the literature. To our knowledge, Hogendorn and Yuen (2009) is the paper
most closely related to the present one. They analyze a situation in which a
player in one side of the market provides an essential consumption good to
the other side and, for that reason, enjoys a higher reservation price.8
The newspaper market is often analyzed with respect to media bias and
partisanship.9 However, some investigations suggest that it is characteristic
8In models of vertically-di¤erentiated products, it is generally the case that higher-
quality varieties have higher equilibrium market shares. Considering for simplicity the
case of duopoly, if one variety is of drastically lower quality than another, the low-quality
variety will have zero equilibrium market share. The central result of this paper is that
exclusion can occur without such quality-di¤erence e¤ects. If we modify the model so that
readers who regard comics as essential have higher reservation prices for a newspaper-
comics bundle, the exclusionary e¤ect of bundling would be reenforced.
9Ellman and Germano (2009) use a two-sided framework to analyze media bias in the
newspaper industry. They show that a monopoly newspaper is prone to under-reporting
news, to the detriment of its advertisers. We use the concept of media bias or partisanship
as a Hotelling transportation cost to consumers.
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of rms in this market to supply components to readers, along with the
primary product. Dewenter (2003) shows that newspapers, among other
media, can form consumer habits that translate into demand for a commodity
that becomes an essential component of the media product. Argentesi (2004)
shows empirically that weekly supplements (comics, puzzles, etc.) increase
readership of and as a result advertisement in, newspapers. If a newspaper
is denied the possibility of supplying habit-forming content, content that a
portion of the population regards as essential, the newspaper will see its
reader base decline.
3 Setup
The basic model is a specialized version of that of Armstrong (2006). There
are two newspapers, A located at the left end and B located at the right end of
a Hotelling line of length 1. Newspapers sell advertising space to advertisers
and print copies of newspapers to readers. We normalize the mass of readers
and the mass of advertisers to be one. niR denotes the number of readers of
newspaper i, and nia denotes the number of rms that advertise in newspaper
i.10
3.1 Readers
The net utility of a reader of newspaper i, before allowing for transportation
costt is
uiR = n
i
a   pi: (1)
We assume readers single-home. For a reader located at x on the Hotelling
line, net utilities are
uAR   tx (2)
from newspaper A,
uBR   t (1  x) ; (3)
from newspaper B.
10In what follows, unless otherwise noted, references to newspaper ishould be under-
stood to carry the qualication for i = A, B.
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Boundary readers are at a location the yields the same net utility from
either newspaper, uAR   tx = uBR   t (1  x), yielding boundary location
x =
1
2
+
uAR   uBR
2t
=
1
2
+
nAa   pA  
 
nBa   pB

2t
: (4)
Each reader selects the newspaper that o¤ers the greatest net utility,
provided that net utility is nonnegative.
The number of readers of each newspaper are
nAR =
1
2
+

 
nAa   nBa
  pA + pB
2t
(5)
nBR =
1
2
+

 
nBa   nAa
  pB + pA
2t
: (6)
3.2 Advertisers
Let i denote newspaper is per-reader advertising rate.11 The cost of placing
an ad in newspaper i is
iniR: (7)
Advertisers di¤er in their prot per sale, . Following Armstrong (2006),
we assume that newspapers do not observe the  of any particular advertiser,
but know the distribution of  in the population of advertisers. We assume
 is uniformly distributed over 0    1.
It will be protable for an advertiser to place an ad in newspaper i if the
prot from placing the ad is greater than or equal to the cost of placing the
ad, niR  iniR. The number of ads demanded from newspaper i is therefore
nia = 1  i: (8)
Substituting (8) in (5) and (6), the number of readers per newspaper
become
nAR =
1
2t

t+ 
 
B   A  pA + pB (9)
and
nBR =
1
2t

t+ 
 
A   B  pB + pA ; (10)
11See Rosse (1970) for an estimation of advertising cost in newspaper and Armstrong
(2006) for discussion of the case in which the price of placing an advertisement is not
proportional to the number of readers.
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respectively.
Advertisers with   A make prot    A on each of the nAR sales they
make to readers of platform A. Advertisers prots on sales to readers of
platform A are12
nAR
Z =1
=A
 
   A d = 1
2
nAR
 
1  A2 : (11)
In the same way, prot on rmsadvertisements in platform B are
1
2
nBR
 
1  B2 : (12)
Advertiserstotal prots are
1
2
nAR
 
1  A2 + 1
2
nBR
 
1  B2 : (13)
3.3 Platforms
Newspapers have a constant marginal cost c to produce a newspaper with na
advertisements, and xed cost F .13 Firm is payo¤ function is
i = niRp
i + iniRn
i
a   cniRnia   F = niR

pi +
 
i   c  1  i  F: (14)
Let
iR = p
i +
 
i   c  1  i (15)
denote newspaper is prot per reader  pi on the sale of the newspaper to
the reader, i  c prot per reader per advertisement placed, and nia = 1 i
advertisements placed.
Firm is prot maximization problem is
max
pi;i
niR
i
R   F: (16)
12(11) can more simply be derived as nAR times the area of a triangle with base 1  A,
the mass of rms that advertise, and height 1  A, the prot of rms with the highest .
13The xed cost of gathering news to produce the rst copy of the paper is typically
high, the variable cost to print and sell additional copies of newspaper lower. See Rosse
(1970) and Strömberg (2004) for estimation and interpretation of cost structures in the
newspaper market.
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Since  is uniformly distributed on (0; 1), the price per reader of an ad-
vertisement cannot be greater than 1. Otherwise no advertisements would
be demanded. In principle, in a platform market, the price-per-reader of an
advertisement could be negative. We will assume that prices to advertisers
and prices to readers are nonnegative. This gives us
0  i  1: (17)
A second constraint appears in the duopoly version of the model. The
usual Hotelling boundary condition ensures that consumers at the boundary
location get identical net utility from either newspaper. An additional re-
quirement, if readers at the boundary location are to be served, is that this
net utility be nonnegative,
nia   pi   tx  0: (18)
Substitute (4) to eliminate x and rearrange terms to obtain an expression
for the market-coverage constraint,
2  t    A + B+ pA + pB; (19)
with choice variables on the right, parameters on the left.
It would be possible to analyze scenarios in which the center of the market
is not served in duopoly equilibrium. But we conne our attention to the
contrary case.
3.4 Syndicate and timing
We model the incentive of a syndicate to o¤er an exclusive license and the
incentive of a newspaper to accept a license, exclusive or not, if o¤ered. The
four stages of the game are shown in Figure 1.
We model the syndicates costs as being entirely sunk before it interacts
with newspapers.14 In stage I, the syndicate o¤ers a license to publish the
complementary material to either one (without loss of generality, to rm A)
or both newspapers. In stage II, if a newspaper is o¤ered a license, it decides
14It would be possible to model the syndicates arrangements with the authors of the
material it markets; this would take us far aeld from our topic. We take it that whatever
the arrangements of a syndicate with its own providers, their interests are served if the
syndicate acts to maximize its prot, given its bargaining power vis-à-vis newspapers.
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I
Syndicate:
o¤er one
or two
licenses
................................................................... II
Platforms:
accept, reject
and remain, or
reject and exit;
set prices
................................................................. III
Advertisers:
place ads
..................................................................................... IV
Readers:
select
newspaper,
if any
Figure 1: Sequence of decisions.
among three options: accept the license, reject the license and remain in
the market, or reject the license and exit the market. If a newspaper is not
o¤ered a license, it decides to remain in the market or to exit. Newspapers
that remain in the market set advertising rates and newspaper prices.
4 A Monopoly Platform
Suppose there is only one platform, rm A. If rm A is a monopoly supplier,
the net utility of a reader located at x is
uAR = 
 
1  A  pA   tx: (20)
If price is low, the market is covered. If price is high, readers far from
newspaper A in preference space are not served under monopoly. The number
of readers is
nAR =
(
1 pA    1  A  t
(1 A) pA
t
pA    1  A  t : (21)
4.1 Low pA
In the low-price case, rm As problem is
max
pA;A
(1)

pA +
 
A   c  1  A  F (22)
such that
pA    1  A  t: (23)
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As shown in the Appendix, As problem can be analyzed formally using
Lagrangian methods. But intuitively, for rm A to maximize prot in the
low-price case, the constraint must be binding for the most distant reader,
pA = 
 
1  A  t: (24)
It cannot be optimal for rm A to leave the most distant consumer with any
surplus.
Given (24), rm As problem can be reformulated as
max
A
 
1  A  + A   c  t  F: (25)
The rst-order condition to solve (25) is 
1  A   + A   c  0: (26)
A marginal increase in A reduces the number of advertisements sold,
1   A. A marginal increase in A increases prot per advertisement,  +
A   c. Part of the change in prot per advertisement is the decrease in the
price readers pay, (24). Part of the increase in prot per advertisement is
the increase in prot from sales to advertisers, A   c.
From (26),
A =
1
2
[1  (  c)]  : (27)
 is the equilibrium price-per-reader of an advertisement not only for the
case of a monopoly platform, but in all the models considered in this paper.
This is the competitive bottleneckaspect of the basic model: depending
on the details (monopoly, duopoly, essential component), a platforms equi-
librium number of readers will vary. But it is a monopolist with respect to
those readersaccess to advertisements.
4.2 High pA
In the high-price regime, rm As problem is
max
pA;A
nAR
A
R   F =

 
1  A  pA
t

pA +
 
A   c  1  A  F; (28)
such that pA    1  A t. In the appendix, we solve the problem without
imposing the constraint, then examine conditions for the solution to satisfy
12
t  1
2
z2 1
2
z2  t  2
3
z2
Licensed ml1 = z
2   t  F ml2 = 14tz4   F
Unlicensed mnl1 = (1  ) (z2   t)  F mnl2 = 1 4t z4   F
Table 1: Monopoly payo¤s.
Licensed dll =
1
2
t  F
Unlicensed dnlnl =
1 
2
t  F
Table 2: Duopoly payo¤s.
the constraint. The consistency condition for the high-price solution to be
valid is that transportation cost be su¢ ciently great,
t  1
2
z2; (29)
where we write
z = 1   (30)
for notational compactness.
4.3 Monopoly Payo¤s
For low levels of transportation cost, t  1
2
z2, a monopoly supplier sets price
so the market is covered, extracting all surplus from the most distant readers.
For higher levels of transportation cost, the market is not covered. Row 1 of
Table 1 gives the equilibrium payo¤ of a monopolist newspaper if all readers
are in the market.
5 Newspaper Duopoly
Our duopoly results, derived in the Appendix, are valid for t  2
3
z2, for which
values of t the market is covered in duopoly equilibrium (see equation (121)).
Duopoly payo¤s if all readers are in the market are given in row 1 of Table
2.
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6 Essential Component
6.1 ReadersDemands
We now assume that the specication of readersdemand in the base model
describes the preferences of a fraction 1  of the population, for 0    1.
Then quantities demanded of each newspaper from this part of the pop-
ulation are
(1  )
"
1
2
+

 
nAa   nBa
  pA + pB
2t
#
(31)
and
(1  )
"
1
2
+

 
nBa   nAa
  pB + pA
2t
#
(32)
from platforms A and B, respectively.
We assume that the remaining portion  of the population will read only
a newspaper that publishes comics. One can interpret  as the portion
of consumers who will read only a certain comic strip and will not accept
substitutes.15 Otherwise, the utility of this group of consumers is as above.
That is, for a consumer who regards comics as an essential component of a
newspaper, comics yield no utility in and of themselves, but are a prerequisite
for getting utility from a newspaper. A consumer who regards comics as
an essential component of a newspaper purchases a newspaper only if it
contains comics and if the net utility from reader the newspaper, allowing
for transportation cost, is nonnegative.
Row 2 of Table 1 gives the equilibrium payo¤s of an unlicensed monop-
olist. Row 2 of Table 2 gives equilibrium payo¤s in a market supplied by
two unlicensed rms. From (15), the reduction in prot of an unlicensed
rm includes lost advertising revenue, a kind of loss specic to a rm that
supplies a platform market.
Taking up the case of duopoly with one rm licensed and one rm un-
licensed, suppose newspaper A has a license to publish comics. The most
distant reader from the comicsgroup who reads newspaper A is
15This phenomenon occurs in other industries. For example, in the Project Run-
waycase discussed in the rst section, 75% of viewers chose to leave Bravo Network
to watch the killer appshow, although Bravo telecast a substitute show (The Fashion
Show).
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(a) at the right end of the line if (recall the length of the line is 1)
uAR   t (1) = nAa   pA   t  0; (33)
or equivalently if pA is su¢ ciently low,
pA  nAa   t; (34)
(b) at distance x  1 that makes net utility zero,
uAR   tx = nAa   pA   tx = 0;
x =
nAa   pA
t
; (35)
if
pA > nAa   t: (36)
The number of A readers from the comics group is
 pA  nAa   t
x p
A  nAa   t : (37)
Quantities demanded of the two newspapers are
nAR = (1  )

1
2
+
uAR   uBR
2t

+

 pA  nAa   t
n
A
a  pA
t
pA  nAa   t
: (38)
nBR = (1  )

1
2
+
uBR   uAR
2t

: (39)
If the utilities are expressed in terms of prices, quantities demanded are
nAR = (1  )
"
1
2
+

 
B   A  pA + pB
2t
#
+
(
 pA    1  A  t

(1 A) pA
t
pA    1  A  t : (40)
nBR = (1  )
"
1
2
+

 
A   B  pB + pA
2t
#
: (41)
Equilibrium di¤ers depending on whether transportation cost is low (t 
1
2
z2) or high (t  1
2
z2). Further, in the low-transportation cost regime,
equilibrium di¤ers depending on whether  is less or greater than
 =
3z2   6t
3z2   2t : (42)
15
     
A (licensed) Adl1 =
(3+)2
1 
t
18
  F Adl2 =
h
1  (1  ) z2
4t
i
(z2   t)  F
B (unlicensed) Bdnl1=
(3 )2
1 
t
18
  F Bdnl2=1 8t z4   F
Table 3: Essential component model payo¤s, low transportation cost.
A (licensed) Adl3 =
1+
2t
h
3(1 )t+4z2
3+5
i2
  F
B (unlicensed) Bdnl3=
1 
2t
h
(3+)t+2z2
3+5
i2
  F
Table 4: Essential component model payo¤s, high transportation cost.
6.2 Payo¤s
Payo¤s for the low-t and high-t cases are given in Tables 3 and 4, respec-
tively. Payo¤s for the case that rm B is licensed and rm A unlicensed are
symmetric with the payo¤s shown in the tables.
7 Exclusion
A short argument (Section 7.1) shows that an exclusive license is not ex-
clusionary for the low-t, low- case. For the low-t, high- and high-t cases,
we examine equilibrium payo¤s in two cases, rst that the syndicate o¤ers a
license to one rm (without loss of generality, rm A), and second that the
syndicate o¤ers a license to both rms.
7.1 Low t, low 
Subtraction shows that the payo¤ of an unlicensed duopolist that competes
with a licensed rival is, for the low-t, low- case, greater than duopoly prot
if both rms are licensed,
(3  )2
1  
t
18
  F  

1
2
t  F

=
t
18
 (3 + )
1   > 0: (43)
Thus
Bdnl1 =
(3  )2
1  
t
18
  F > 1
2
t  F = dll: (44)
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We assume that duopoly is protable if both rms have licenses, dll > 0.
This implies Bdnl1 > 0. Then if rm A operates with an exclusive license,
rm B will operate, protably, without a license. An exclusive license is
not exclusionary if consumers regard the two newspapers as close substitutes
(low t) and few consumers regard comics as essential (low ).
7.2 Low t, high  and high t
Theorem 1 In the low-t, high- and high-t cases, for  su¢ ciently close to
1, and in the high-t case for F  7
24
z2, it is a subgame perfect equilibrium for
the syndicate to o¤er an exclusive license to rm A for a license fee slightly
greater than 2dll, for rm A to accept the o¤er, and for rm B to exit the
market.
7.2.1 Payo¤s
Here we present the argument for the low-t, high- case. Minor changes in
the rst part of the argument, which are given in the Appendix, lead to the
same result for the high-t case.
The inequalities
max
 
dnlnl ; 
m
nl1; 
Bd
nl2

< 0  min  dll; ml1 ; Adl2  (45)
correspond to
max

1  
2
t; (1  )  z2   t ; 1  
8t
z4

< F 
min

1
2
t; z2   t;

1  (1  ) z
2
4t
  
z2   t : (46)
As ! 1, (46) approaches
max (0; 0; 0) = 0 < F  min

1
2
t; z2   t; z2   t

: (47)
Considering the expression on the right,
z2   t  1
2
t =
3
2

2
3
z2   t

> 0: (48)
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Hence as ! 1 (47) reduces to
0 < F  1
2
t; (49)
and the assumption that licensed duopoly is protable16 guarantees that (49)
is satised. Assume  is large enough so (45) holds. Then it is protable to be
a licensed monopolist (ml1 > 0) or duopolist(
d
ll > 0, 
Ad
l2 > 0), unprotable
to be an unlicensed monopolist (mnl1 < 0) or duopolist (
d
nlnl < 0, 
Bd
nl2 < 0).
7.2.2 Exclusive license
Let the syndicate o¤er A an exclusive contract for a license fee that leaves A
a positive payo¤. As options are to reject the contract and exit the market
(breaking even), refuse the contract and remain in the market, or accept
the contract. If A rejects the contract and continues in the market without
a license, Bs options are to exit or to continue in the market. If B exits,
rm A is an unlicensed monopolist, earning mnl1 < 0. If B continues in the
market, both rms earn dnlnl < 0. If A accepts the contract, Bs options are
to exit (breaking even) or to compete as an unlicensed duopolist (earning
Bdnl2 < 0); rm Bs payo¤-maximizing choice is to exit. If rm B exits,
economic prot from the operation of newspaper A is ml1 > 0. As the license
fee (discussed further below) leaves A with a positive payo¤, accepting the
o¤er of a license dominates As alternative choices. If the syndicate o¤ers
rm A an exclusive license, the equilibrium outcome is that A accepts the
o¤er, B exits, newspaper A generates monopoly prot ml1 , and the license
fee determines the division of ml1 between A and the syndicate.
7.2.3 Dual licenses
We expect that in a market with two suppliers, each would learn the terms
of the license o¤ered to the other.17 Let the syndicate simultaneously and
publicly o¤er licenses to A and B for a license fee that leaves each rm at least
small positive payo¤ if both rms accept the o¤er of a license. If A rejects
the license and exits, B earns a positive prot (approximately ml1   dll) if it
16If licensed monopoly is protable, ml1  0, and licensed duopoly not protable, dll < 0,
there is one newspaper in equilibrium. But exclusion is not a factor.
17Hart and Tirole (1990) examine the di¤erent implications of public as opposed to
private vertical contracts.
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accepts the license, which dominates the losses it would make as an unlicensed
monopolist or breaking even if it exits the market. If A rejects the license
and continues in the market, B makes a positive prot (given the symmetry
of payo¤s, approximately Adl2  dll) if it accepts the license, which dominates
the losses it would make as an unlicensed duopolist or breaking even if it
exits the market. If A accepts the license, and B accepts the license as well,
B makes a small positive prot, which dominates the losses it would make
(Bdnl2 < 0) competing without a license against a licensed rm A or breaking
even if it exits. No matter how rm A responds to the o¤er of a license, rm
B maximizes its payo¤by accepting the o¤er of a license. Firm As incentives
are the same. If the syndicate o¤ers both rms licenses on terms that leave
them small positive payo¤s if both accept, the equilibrium outcome is for
both rms to accept the o¤er.
7.2.4 Syndicates payo¤ and overall outcome
The economic prot generated by newspaper A as a licensed monopolist is
ml1 = z
2  t F . The economic prot generated by either newspaper if both
rms have licenses is dll =
1
2
t   F . Monopoly prot exceeds total duopoly
prot,
ml1   2dll = z2   t  F   2

1
2
t  F

= 2

1
2
z2   t

+ F > 0: (50)
(recall that t  1
2
z2 in the low-t case).
If the syndicate makes public o¤ers of licenses to both newspapers, asking
a license fee slightly less than dll, the best alternative for either newspaper
is to accept the o¤er of a license. Neglecting the small reductions in the
license fees, the syndicates payo¤would be 2dll. Then if the syndicate o¤ers
an exclusive license to (say) rm A, rm A could o¤er to pay the syndicate
a license fee slightly greater than 2dll, leaving the syndicate strictly better
o¤ than if it were to license both rms. Firm As payo¤, slightly less than
Aml1   2dll > 0, would dominate its near-zero payo¤ as one of two licensed
duopolists.18
18The mechanism at work here is essentially the same as that underlying pay for de-
laysettlements between patented and generic drug manufacturers in the pharmaceutical
industry. See, for example, Hemphill (2006).
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Monopoly Duopoly
low-t, high- high-t
Newspapersprot z2   t  F 1
4t
z4   F 2  1
2
t  F
CS 1
2
t 1
8t
z4 z2   5
4
t
Advertisersprot 1
2
z2 1
4t
z4 1
2
z2
NSW 3
2
z2   1
2
t  F 5
8t
z4   F 3
2
z2   1
4
t  2F
Table 5: Consumer Surplus and Net Social Welfare.
8 Welfare Consequences
We show in the Appendix that prot, consumer surplus, and net social wel-
fare in the various regimes are as reported in Table 5. The newspapers
prot given in the rst row of the table is the total prot generated by
the operation of active newspapers. The license fee determines the division
of this surplus between newspaper and syndicate, but does not a¤ect the
amount of the surplus.
8.1 Comparison: duopoly and low-t, high- monopoly
Comparing duopoly and low-t, high- monopoly gives
ml1   2dll = 2

1
2
z2   t

+ F > 0: (51)
CSd   CSmltl =
7
4

4
7
z2   t

> 0: (52)
Advertisersprot is the same under both regimes, since the market is
covered in both cases. Thus monopoly prot is greater than total duopoly
prot, and duopoly consumer surplus is greater than monopoly consumer
surplus, in the low-t, high- case.
Duopoly net social welfare may be greater or less than monopoly net
social welfare.
NSW d  NSWmltl =
1
4
t  F: (53)
We have assumed that licensed duopoly is protable for both rms, 1
2
t 
F  0. (53) is thus of ambiguous sign. If reader preferences are strong (large
t) and xed cost low, duopoly net social welfare exceeds monopoly net social
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welfare. If reader preferences are weak and xed cost high, monopoly net
social welfare (which economizes on xed cost, relative to duopoly) exceeds
duopoly net social welfare. This result is comparable with the ndings of
Weeds (2009) and other exclusivity analyses in TV market.
8.2 Comparison: duopoly and high-t monopoly
Monopoly prot exceeds the prot of one duopolist. For duopoly and high-t
monopoly, we have
ml2   2dll =
1
t

1
2
z2   t

1
2
z2 + t

+ F: (54)
In the high-t case 1
2
z2  t  2
3
z2, for which values of t the rst term on
the right is nonpositive. ml2   2dll = F > 0 for t = 12z2. As t rises from
1
2
z2 to 2
3
z2, the rst term on the right falls from 0 to   7
24
z2.19 If F  7
24
z2,
ml2  2dll for all values of t admissible in the high-t case. For F in the range
0  F < 7
24
z2, ml2   2dll is positive, zero, or negative as t is less than, equal
to, or greater than 1
2
F + 1
2
p
F 2 + z4.
Consumer surplus,
CSd   CShmht =
5
4

2
3
z2   t

+
2
15t
z2

t  1
10
z2

> 0: (56)
and advertisersprot,
mAd   2dAd =
1
2t
z2

t  1
2
z2

> 0: (57)
are both greater under duopoly than under high-t monopoly.
The di¤erence in net social welfare,
NSW d  NSWmht =
1
4

2
3
z2   t

+
4
3t
z2

t  15
32
z2

  F; (58)
is of ambiguous sign (the rst two expressions on the right are positive).
It is su¢ cient for duopoly net social welfare to exceed monopoly net social
19That is,
@
@t
 
ml2   2dll

=  
"
1 +
1
4

z2
t
2#
< 0: (55)
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welfare that monopoly newspaper prot be less than duopoly newspaper
prot. Generally, the right-hand side of (58) is more likely to be positive the
smaller is xed cost and the stronger20 are reader preferences.
9 Conclusion
In this article we build a model of a two-sided market with an essential com-
plementary commodity. A fraction of agents on one side of the market view
the complementary good as essential for transacting on the platform. If a
platform makes an exclusive deal with the supplier of the essential commod-
ity, then (depending on the proportion of the agents who view the commodity
as essential and the transportation cost (preferences) of agents), it is possible
that the rival platform is excluded from the market. This may result in a loss
in consumer surplus and net social welfare. We also show that under certain
conditions (weak consumer preferences between newspapers, few consumers
who regard the complementary good as essential), an exclusive deal might
not result in exclusion, and increases the prot of both platforms.
The literature on one-sided markets suggests (for example, Whinston
(1990)) that tying, bundling, and exclusive contracts may, but need not,
have exclusionary e¤ect. Our results extend this nding to two-sided mar-
kets. Many regional markets  regional in physical space, regional in prod-
uct characteristic space  will support at most a small number of rms.
In such markets, an exclusive contract for a complementary product that a
su¢ ciently large number of consumers view as essential can make unlicensed
rms unprotable, inducing exit, reducing consumer surplus and, in some
cases (strong reader preferences, low xed cost) reducing net social welfare.
There are several possible directions in which this analysis might be ex-
tended. One would be to explicitly model multiple syndicates and competi-
tion between syndicates. It would be possible to endogenize the location of
platforms in preference space, and examine the impact of interactions with
the essential commodity on location choice. Finally, rather than treating
the proportion of agents who view a commodity as essential as exogenous,
it would be possible to model consumers habit formation through marketing
e¤orts or investment in quality.
20 @
@t
 
NSW d  NSWmht

=   52t2

1p
10
t  12z2

1p
10
t+ 12z
2

> 0, since in the high-t
case 1p
10
t  12z2 

2
3
1p
10
  12

z2   0:28918z2 < 0.
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11 Appendix
In Section 11.1 we derive payo¤s under the various market regimes considered
in the paper. In Section 11.2 we derive expressions for consumer surplus and
net social welfare for the licensed-monopoly and licensed-duopoly regimes.
In Section 11.3 we give steps in the proof of Theorem 1 for the high-t case.
11.1 Payo¤s
11.1.1 Licensed Monopoly
Suppose there is only one platform, rm A. If rm A is a monopoly supplier,
its objective function is
nAR
A
R   F: (59)
Prot per reader is
AR = p
A +
 
A   c  1  A : (60)
The number of advertisements is
nAa = 1  A: (61)
Net utility of a reader located at x is
uAR = 
 
1  A  pA   tx: (62)
If the rm A has a license, the number of readers is
nAR = 1 (63)
if

 
1  A  pA   t  0 (64)
or equivalently
pA    1  A  t (65)
and
x =

 
1  A  pA
t
(66)
if
pA    1  A  t: (67)
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This gives rm As licensed monopoly number of readers, (21),
nAR =
(
1 pA    1  A  t
(1 A) pA
t
pA    1  A  t : (68)
Consider the low-price and high-price regimes in turn.
pA    1  A  t If pA    1  A  t, rm As problem is
max
pA;A
(1)

pA +
 
A   c  1  A  F s.t. pA    1  A  t: (69)
Set up (69) as a constrained optimization problem. A Lagrangian is
L = pA +  A   c  1  A  F +    1  A  t  pA : (70)
Kuhn-Tucker rst-order conditions are
pA:
@L
@pA
= 1   = 0: (71)
A:  
A   c ( 1) + (1)  1  A   = 0 (72)
Substituting  = 1 and rearranging terms gives
A =
1
2
[1  (  c)] = : (73)
:
@L
@
= 
 
1  A  t  pA  0 (74)



 
1  A  t  pA = 0 (75)
  0: (76)
Then  = 1 implies that the constraint is binding, (writing z = 1   ,
(30))
pA = z   t: (77)
If it maximizes prot subject to the constraint that the market be covered,
rm A sets a price that takes all surplus from the most distant readers.
Firm As monopoly payo¤ in the low-price regime is
pA +
 
A   c  1  A  F = z   t+ z (   c)  F
(and using +    c = 1   = z)
= z (+    c)  t  F = z2   t  F: (78)
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pA    1  A  t If pA    1  A  t, rm As problem is
max
pA;A
nAR
A
R   F s.t. pA  
 
1  A  t: (79)
We rst work out the solution without imposing the constraint, then
determine a condition under which the unconstrained solution satises the
constraint.
First-order conditions for the unconstrained problem are
nAR
@AR
@pA
+ AR
@nAR
@pA
= 0 (80)
and
nAR
@AR
@A
+ AR
@nAR
@A
= 0 (81)
with
AR = p+
 
A   c  1  A (82)
(so that @
A
R
@p
= 1, @
A
R
@
= 1  2 + c) and
nAR =

 
1  A  pA
t
; (83)
(so that @n
A
R
@p
=  1
t
, @n
A
R
@
=  
t
.)
Substituting, the monopoly rst-order conditions are
nAR  
1
t
AR = 0 (84)
nAR (1  2 + c) 

t
AR = 0: (85)
Substitute AR = tn
A
R from (84) into (85) to obtain
nAR (1  2 + c  ) = 0; (86)
from which
A =
1
2
[1  (  c)] = : (87)
Substituting A =  into (84) gives rm As monopoly price,
nAR  
1
t
AR = 0
27
z   p
t
  1
t
[p+ z (   c)] = 0;
which yields (omitting several steps)
pAM =
1
2
z (+ c  ) : (88)
The consistency condition for (88) to be a valid solution is that trans-
portation costbe su¢ ciently great:
pAM  z   t;
which leads to
t  1
2
z2: (89)
Now using (83), rm As equilibrium number of readers is
nAR =
z   pA
t
=
z2
2t
: (90)
Firm As equilibrium monopoly payo¤ in the high-t case is
nAR
A
R   F =
(substituting AR = tn
A
R)
t
 
nAR
2   F =
(substituting (90))
1
4t
z4   F: (91)
The high-price solution is valid for t  1
2
z2. For t  1
2
z2, it is the low-price
solution that is valid.
11.1.2 Unlicensed monopoly
We need an expression for rm As payo¤as an unlicensed monopolist serving
a market with 1  readers. The only change from the previous case is that
the number of readers is reduced by the scale factor 1  . Payo¤s are
(1  ) (z2   t)  F if pA    1  A  t
1 
4t
z4   F if pA    1  A  t : (92)
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11.1.3 Duopoly, both rms licensed
The rst-order conditions for rm As prot maximization problem, (16) with
i = A, are
@A
@pA
= nAR
@AR
@pA
+ AR
@nAR
@pA
= 0 (93)
and
@A
@A
= nAR
@AR
@A
+ AR
@nAR
@A
= 0; (94)
where from (15)
@AR
@pA
= 1 (95)
@AR
@A
=
 
A   c ( 1) + 1  A = 1 + c  2A: (96)
and from (9)
@nAR
@pA
=   1
2t
(97)
@nAR
@A
=   
2t
: (98)
Substituting (95), (96), (97), and (98) into (93) and (94) gives the rst-
order conditions
@A
@pA
= nAR  
1
2t
AR  0 (99)
and
@A
@A
= nAR
 
1 + c  2A  
2t
AR  0: (100)
If (99) holds, which it will in equilibrium,
AR = 2tn
A
R: (101)
It follows that in equilibrium, rm As payo¤ is
A = nAR
A
R = 2t
 
nAR
2   F: (102)
Substitute (101) into (99) to eliminate nAR, obtaining
@A
@A
=
AR
2t
 
1 + c  2A    = 0: (103)
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For a positive equilibrium prot per reader, AR > 0, (103) gives the
equilibrium value of rm As price-per-reader per advertisement:
A =
1
2
[1  (  c)] = : (104)
We assume that marginal utility per ad in a newspaper exceeds marginal
cost per ad in a newspaper,
  c > 0: (105)
The per-reader advertising rate, A, cannot exceed advertisersprot per
reader, the maximum value of which is 1. This gives
0  A  1;
which implies
0  1  (  c)  2 (106)
as a pair of inequalities that must be satised by   c.
(105) and (106) give
1    c  0: (107)
In the same way, we obtain for rm B the rst-order conditions
@B
@pB
= nBR  
1
2t
BR  0 (108)
and
@B
@B
= nBR
 
1 + c  2B  
2t
BR  0; (109)
and the equilibrium price-per-reader of an advertisement,
B =
1
2
[1  (  c)] = : (110)
From (8), the equilibrium number of advertisements (the same for both
newspapers) is
nAa = n
B
a = 1   =
1
2
(1 +   c) : (111)
The rst-order conditions for pA and pB are (99) and (108), respectively.
Substituting the equilibrium values of i into (9) and (10) gives expressions
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for the numbers of readers per newspaper as functions of prices per reader,
when A = B = :
nAR =
1
2t
 
t  pA + pB ; (112)
nBR =
1
2t
 
t  pB + pA : (113)
Prot-per-reader of newspapers A and B are
AR = p
A + z (   c) (114)
and
BR = p
B + z (   c) ; (115)
respectively.
Using (114) and (115), the rst-order conditions (99) and (108) become
2pA   pB = t  z (   c) (116)
for pA and
 pA + 2pBR = t  z (   c) (117)
for pB.
The system of rst-order equations, which we write in this form to permit
comparison with (151) and (207), is
2  1
 1 2

pA
pB

= [t  z (   c)]

1
1

: (118)
Equilibrium prices are
pA = pB = t  z (   c) : (119)
From (19), for the market to be covered for these prices requires that t
not be too great,
2  t    A + B+ pA + pB;
t  2
3
z ( +   c) ; (120)
or, using  +   c = 1   = z,
t  2
3
z2: (121)
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From (102), in equilibrium
A = 2t
 
nAR
2   F:
But if the market is covered in symmetric equilibrium, nAR =
1
2
(see also
(112)). Hence
A = B =
1
2
t  F: (122)
11.1.4 Duopoly, A & B unlicensed
The only change from the previous case is that the number of readers is
scaled down by the factor 1  . Equilibrium payo¤s per rm are
A = B =
1  
2
t  F: (123)
11.1.5 Duopoly, A licensed, B not
If pA  nAa   t, objective functions are
A = nAR
A
R   F (124)
and
B = nBR
B
R   F: (125)
pA  nAa   t First analyze the outcome on the assumption that equi-
librium values place demand in the low-pA case. Analyze rm As prot-
maximization problem without imposing
pA  nAa   t (126)
as a constraint. Find equilibrium prices, and nd conditions for (126) to be
satised.
The number of readers of each rm are
nAR = (1  )
"
1
2
+

 
B   A  pA + pB
2t
#
+  (127)
=
1
2
"
(1 + ) + (1  ) 
 
B   A  pA + pB
t
#
: (128)
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nBR =
1
2
(1  )
"
1 +

 
A   B  pB + pA
t
#
: (129)
The following comparative static derivatives will be used later. For the
numbers of readers,
@nAR
@pA
=
@nBR
@pB
=  1  
2t
(130)
@nAR
@A
=
@nBR
@B
=  1  
2t
(131)
For protability per reader,
AR = p
A +
 
A   c  1  A
BR = p
B +
 
B   c  1  B
@AR
@pA
=
@AR
@pB
= 1 (132)
@AR
@A
= 1 + c  2A (133)
@BR
@B
= 1 + c  2B: (134)
Firm A Firm As rst-order conditions are
pA:
@A
@pA
= nAR
@AR
@pA
+ AR
@nAR
@pA
= 0
@A
@pA
= nAR  
1  
2t
AR = 0: (135)
From (135), in equilibrium
AR = p
A +
 
A   c  1  A = 2t
1  n
A
R: (136)
Hence rm As equilibrium prot satises
A =
2t
1  
 
nAR
2   F: (137)
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A:
@A
@A
= nAR
@AR
@A
+ AR
@nAR
@A
= 0
@A
@A
= nAR
 
1 + c  2A  1  
2t
AR = 0: (138)
Substituting (136) into (138), in equilibrium
nAR
 
1 + c  2A   = 0 (139)
and since nAR > 0, in equilibrium
A =
1
2
[1  (  c)] = : (140)
Firm B Firm Bs payo¤ function is
B = nBR
B
R   F:
The rst-order condition with respect to pB is
@B
@pB
= nBR  
1  
2t
BR = 0: (141)
From (141), in equilibrium
pB +
 
B   c  1  B = 2t
1  n
B
R (142)
Hence rm Bs equilibrium prot satises
B =
2t
1  
 
nBR
2   F: (143)
The rst-order condition with respect to B is
@B
@B
= nBR
 
1 + c  2B  1  
2t
BR = 0: (144)
Substituting (142) into (144), in equilibrium
nBR
 
1 + c  2B  1  
2t
2t
1  n
B
R = 0
nBR

1 + c  2B    = 0;
and for nBR > 0 we have
B =
1
2
[1  (  c)] = : (145)
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Equilibrium nAR, n
B
R (I) Use the equilibrium values of 
A and B to
rewrite (127) and (129) as
nAR =
1
2

(1 + )  (1  ) p
A   pB
t

(146)
and
nBR =
1
2
(1  )

1 +
pA   pB
t

: (147)
Equilibrium pA, pB Using (146), rm As rst-order condition for pA,
(135), becomes
2pA   pB = 1 + 
1  t  z (
   c) : (148)
This is rm As equilibrium price best-response equation  equilibrium
because the s are set at their equilibrium values.
Using (147), rm Bs rst-order condition for pB, (141), becomes
 pA + 2pB = t  z (   c) : (149)
This is rm Bs equilibrium price best-response equation.
(148) and (149) can be solved for equilibrium prices.
Before doing so, subtract (149) from (148) to obtain an expression for
pA   pB, which is what is needed to nd the equilibrium number of readers
for each newspaper:
pA   pB = 2
3

1  t: (150)
Now write the system of rst-order equations in matrix form as
2  1
 1 2

pA
pB

=
 1+
1 
1

t  z (   c)

1
1

; (151)
from which 
pA
pB

=
1
3
1
1  

3 + 
3  

t  z (   c)

1
1

: (152)
pA =
1
3
3 + 
1  t  z (
   c) (153)
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pB =
1
3
3  
1  t  z (
   c) : (154)
Subtracting (154) from (153) gives (150).
In a conventional oligopoly model, it would be taken for granted that
pA  0, pB  0. In general in a model of a platform market, we cannot
assume this. However, if the unconstrained model implies negative prices for
newspapers, we would wish to impose zero prices as a constraint and pursue
the implications. We therefore assume pA  0, pB  0. See the discussion of
Armstrong and Wright (2007, p. 356), who make the same assumption.
Since
@pA
@
=
t
3
@
@

3 + 
1  

=
4t
3
1
(1  )2 > 0 (155)
@pB
@
=
t
3
@
@

3  
1  

=
2t
3
1
(1  )2 > 0; (156)
pA and pB are increasing in . It follows that platformsprots per reader,
AR = p
A + z (   c) = 1
3
3 + 
1  t (157)
and
BR = p
B + z (   c) = 1
3
3  
1  t (158)
are also increasing in .
Consistency condition Now examine conditions under which (126),
pA  nAa   t, will be satised.
A preliminary remark is that considering the group that does not regard
comics as essential, it must also be that consumers at the boundary location
have nonnegative net utility,
nAa   pA   tx  0;
for x the boundary distance from the left end of the line. But if a reader at
the right end of the line would have nonnegative net utility,
0  nAa   pA   t;
then so would a reader located closer to the left end of the line,
nAa   pA   tx = nAa   pA   t+ (1  x) > 0;
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and this is true in particular if x is the boundary location.
Now examine conditions for (126) to be satised:
nAa   pA   t  0:
z  

1
3
3 + 
1  t  z (
   c)

  t  0
Omitting several steps, this the consistency condition becomes
t  3
2
1  
3  z
2: (159)
The right-hand side of (159) goes to 0 as ! 1. It follows that there is a
critical value , 0 <  < 1, such that the consistency condition is satised
exactly.  is dened by
3
2
1  
3  z
2 = t: (160)
From (160),
 =
3z2   6t
3z2   2t : (161)
By the argument we made about starting at  = 0 and increasing , 
must lie between 0 and 1.
pA =
1
3
3 + 
1  t  z (
   c) :
For  = ,
pA = z   t:
pB =
1
3
3  
1  t  z (
   c) :
Evaluate this for  = ; the result will be used below. Omitting several
steps,
pB =
1
3
3  
1   t  z (
   c) = 1
2
z2   z (   c) : (162)
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Equilibrium nAR, n
B
R (II) Substituting the expression for p
A   pB,
(150), into (146) and (147), the equilibrium numbers of readers per news-
paper in the low-pA regime are
nAR =
1
6
(3 + ) (163)
nBR =
1
6
(3  ) : (164)
In the unconstrained low-pA regime, nAR rises from
1
2
and nBR falls from
1
2
as  rises from 0.
Payo¤s Substitute from (163) and (164) into (137) and (143), respec-
tively, equilibrium payo¤s are
A =
t
18
(3 + )2
1     F (165)
and
B =
t
18
(3  )2
1     F: (166)
Comparative static derivatives with respect to  are
@A
@
=
t
18
(3 + ) (5  )
(1  )2 > 0 (167)
@B
@
=
t
18
(1 + ) (3  )
(1  )2 > 0: (168)
As  increases, in a comparative static sense, AR and n
A
R both rise, so 
A,
their product, certainly rises.
As  increases, BR rises and n
B
R falls. In the low-p
A regime, the former
e¤ect outweighs the latter, and B rises as  rises from 0 to .
Constrained The equilibrium value
pA =
1
3
3 + 
1  t  z (
   c) ;
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which is obtained by solving rm As prot maximization problem for the
low-pA case without explicitly imposing the low-pA constraint,
pA  z   t; (169)
satises the low-pA constraint for   . For   , to obtain an equi-
librium value of pA consistent with the condition that denes nAR for the
low-pA case requires imposing (169) as an explicit constraint on rm As
prot-maximization problem.
In the low-pA case, nAR is given by (128). A Lagrangian for rm As
constrained optimization problem is
L = nARAR   F + 


 
1  A  t  pA : (170)
Assuming an interior solution, the Kuhn-Tucker rst-order conditions are
pA:
nAR
@AR
@pA
+ AR
@nAR
@pA
   = 0: (171)
A:
nAR
@AR
@A
+ AR
@nAR
@A
   = 0: (172)
:

 
1  A  t  pA = 0: (173)
Substituting (130), (131), (132), (133), and (134), (171) and (172) become
nAR  
1  
2t
AR    = 0: (174)
and
nAR
 
1 + c  2A  1  
2t
AR    = 0; (175)
respectively.

 
1  A  t  pA = 0: (176)
From (174),
1  
2t
AR = n
A
R   ;
leading to
AR =
2t
1  
 
nAR   

: (177)
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Substitute (177) into (175) to obtain
A =
1
2
[1  (  c)] = : (178)
Firm Bs problem is una¤ected by the constraint imposed on rm A.
Thus we have
B =
1
2
[1  (  c)] = ;
as before. It follows that the expressions (146) and (147) for nAR and n
B
R,
respectively, are valid for the constrained optimization case.
Since we know , we now have two equations, (174) and (176).
From (174),
 = nAR  
1  
2t
AR; (179)
and substituting for nAR and 
A
R, this becomes (omitting several steps)
 =
1
2
(1 + ) +
1  
2t

pB   2pA   z (   c) : (180)
Rewriting (180) in a form that highlights the relationship to the rst-order
condition for pA when the constraint does not bind, (148), gives
 =
1  
2t

1 + 
1  t  z (
   c)   2pA   pB : (181)
There is further analysis of the equilibrium value of  below.
From the binding constraint, we get the value of pA:
pA = z   t: (182)
Firm Bs best-response equation is unchanged by the fact that the con-
straint on rm As problem is binding; it is
 pA + 2pB = t  z (   c) : (183)
Substituting (182) into (183), rm Bs equilibrium price when rm As
price is determined by the constraint is
pB =
1
2
z (   + c) : (184)
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By denition of ,
1
3
3  
1   t =
1
2
z2:
Hence if  = , rm Bs equilibrium price per newspaper when rm As
optimization problem is unconstrained is
pB =
1
2
z2   z (   c) :
This is identical to (162); rm Bs equilibrium price is continuous in 
at the value of  for which the constraint on rm As low-pA optimization
problem becomes binding.
When the low-pA constraint is binding, the di¤erence in equilibrium prices
is
pA   pB = 1
2
z2   t:
Above, (159), for consistency in the low-pA regime with  = 0, we as-
sumed
1
2
z2  t:
This implies that in equilibrium in the constrained case
pA   pB = 1
2
(1  )2   t > 0: (185)
Find the equilibrium numbers of readers per platform,
nAR =
1
2

1 + + (1  ) p
B   pA
t

nBR =
1
2
(1  )

1 +
pA   pB
t

:
Using (185), (omitting several steps)
nAR = 1  (1  )
z2
4t
: (186)
nBR = (1  )
z2
4t
: (187)
Thus
nAR + n
B
R = 1:
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In the low-pA case, the market is covered.
Find equilibrium rm payo¤s.
A = nAR
A
R   F
B = nBR
B
R   F:
For rm B, we have as before
B =
2t
1  
 
nBR
2   F: (188)
When the low-pA constraint is binding,
AR =
2t
1  
 
nAR   

;
and rm As equilibrium payo¤ satises
A =
2t
1  n
A
R
 
nAR   
  F: (189)
One of the expressions for  is (181),
 =
1  
2t

1 + 
1  t 

2pA   pB + z (   c) :
Consider the expression in brackets; substituting (182) and (184), it is
2pA   pB + z (   c) =
2 [z   t]  1
2
z (   + c) + z (   c) =
(omitting several steps)
3
2
z2   2t:
Then
 =
1
2

3    1  
t
3
2
z2

(190)
From (186)
nAR = 1  (1  )
z2
4t
:
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Then
nAR    =
1  
2

z2
t
  1

: (191)
Firm As payo¤ in the low-pA regime when the low-pA constraint is bind-
ing is
A =
2t
1  n
A
R
 
nAR   
  F = 1  (1  ) z2
4t
 
z2
t
  1

t  F: (192)
A rises as  rises.
Firm Bs equilibrium payo¤ is
B =
2t
1  
 
nBR
2   F = 1  
8t
z4   F: (193)
pA  nAa   t The underlying expressions for nBR and BR are unchanged
from the previous case. Firm Bs choice of B is given by (145), and its
rst-order conditions are as in the low-pA regime.
Firm As prot per reader,
AR = p
A +
 
A   c  1  A ;
is also as in the low-pA regime. But in the high-pA regime (from (40)),
platform As number of readers is
nAR = (1  )
"
1
2
+

 
B   A  pA + pB
2t
#
+ 
nAa   pA
t
= (1  )
"
1
2
  
 
1  B  pB
2t
#
+ (1 + )

 
1  A  pA
2t
: (194)
Firm As rst-order condition with respect to pA is
@A
@pA
= nAR  
1 + 
2t

pA +
 
A   c  1  A  0 (195)
(compare with (135) for the low-pA regime).
From (195), in equilibrium
AR = p
A +
 
A   c  1  A = 2t
1 + 
nAR (196)
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and rm As equilibrium payo¤ satises
A =
2t
1 + 
 
nAR
2   F: (197)
Firm As rst-order condition with respect to A is
@A
@A
= nAR
@AR
@A
+ AR
@nAR
@A
 0 (198)
or
@A
@A
= nAR
 
1 + c  2A  1 + 
2t
AR  0: (199)
Substituting (196) into (199), in equilibrium
nAR
 
1 + c  2A     0
and
A =
1
2
(1 + c  ) = : (200)
Equilibrium nAR, n
B
R (I) Substituting 
A = B =  in (194) and
(129), the equilibrium numbers of readers satisfy
nAR =
1
2
(1  ) +  (1  )
t
  (1 + ) p
A
2t
+ (1  ) p
B
2t
(201)
and
nBR =
1
2
(1  )

1 +
pA   pB
t

: (202)
Equilibrium pA, pB Using (201), rm As rst-order condition for pA,
(195),
@A
@pA
= nAR  
1 + 
2t

pA + z (   c)  0;
becomes (omitting several steps)
2 (1 + ) pA   (1  ) pB = t  z (   c)  ft  2z + z (   c)g: (203)
The rst-order condition for pB is
 pA + 2pB = t  z (   c) : (204)
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Write the system of equations is
2 (1 + )   (1  )
 1 2

pA
pB

= [t  z (   c)]

1
1

 ft  2z + z (   c)g

1
0

: (205)
The system of rst-order conditions can be solved for prices,
(3 + 5)

pA
pB

= [t  z (   c)]

2 1  
1 2 (1 + )

1
1

 ft  2z + z (   c)g

2 1  
1 2 (1 + )

1
0

: (206)
Instead of looking at the solutions written in this form, it is useful to
multiply both sides of (206) by
2  1
 1 2

;
obtaining a transformed system of equations
(3 + 5)

2  1
 1 2

pA
pB

= [t  z (   c)]

2  1
 1 2

2 1  
1 2 (1 + )

1
1

 ft  2z + z (   c)g

2  1
 1 2

2 1  
1 2 (1 + )

1
0

:
Coe¢ cient matrices on the right are
2  1
 1 2

2 1  
1 2 (1 + )

1
1

=

3  4
3 + 5

=

3 + 5  9
3 + 5

and 
2  1
 1 2

2 1  
1 2 (1 + )

1
0

=

3
0

:
The transformed system of equations is (omitting several steps)
2  1
 1 2

pA
pB

= [t  z (   c)]

1
1

  12
3 + 5

t  1
2
z

1
0

:
(207)
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The rst equation in (207) is a linear combination of the rst-order conditions
of the two platforms. It is clear from (207) that if  = 0, the system of rst-
order conditions of the essential component model corresponds to the system
of rst-order conditions of the basic model.
Solving (207) gives equilibrium prices
pA
pB

= [t  z (   c)]

1
1

  4
3 + 5

t  1
2
z2

2
1

: (208)
pA = t  z (   c)  8
3 + 5

t  1
2
z2

: (209)
pB = t  z (   c)  4
3 + 5

t  1
2
z

: (210)
Numbers of readers We use (209) and (210) to evaluate the numbers of
readers of each platform, (201) and (202).
Considering rst platform B, from (209) and (210),
pA   pB =   4
3 + 5

t  1
2
z2

< 0: (211)
Substituting (211) into (202) and rearranging terms gives
nBR =
1  
2t
(3 + ) t+ 2z2
3 + 5
: (212)
Now turn to platform A. We need to evaluate
  (1 + ) pA + (1  ) pB =    pA   pB    pA + pB : (213)
From (208),
  (1 + ) pA + (1  ) pB =
(omitting several steps)
 2

1  
3 + 5
t  z (   c) + 1 + 3
3 + 5
z2

: (214)
Then
nAR =
1
2
(1  ) + z
t
+
  (1 + ) pA + (1  ) pB
2t
=
46
(omitting several steps)
=
1 + 
3 + 5

3
2
(1  ) + 2z
2
t


: (215)
The total number of readers is
nAR + n
B
R =
1
3 + 5

(1  ) (3 + 2) +  (3 + ) z
2
t

: (216)
Consistency The consistency condition is
pA  nAa   t:
Rewrite (209) to collect terms in t to obtain
pA = 3
1  
3 + 5
t  z (   c) + 4
3 + 5
z2:
Then
pA   nAa + t = 2
3 + 
3 + 5

t  1
2
z2

:
In the high-pA case, consistency requires
t  1
2
z2:
In the unconstrained low-pA case, consistency requires the opposite rela-
tionship (see (159) for  = 0):
1
2
z2  t:
Payo¤s From (197) and (143), equilibrium payo¤s are
A =
2t
1 + 
 
nAR
2   F
and
B =
2t
1  
 
nBR
2   F:
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Figure 2: Consumer surplus, monopoly, low-t regime.
Using (215), rm As equilibrium payo¤ is
A = 2t
1 + 
(3 + 5)2

3
2
(1  ) + 2z
2
t

2
  F: (217)
Using (212), rm Bs equilibrium payo¤ is
B =
1  
2t

(3 + ) t+ 2z2
3 + 5
2
  F: (218)
As ! 1, B becomes negative.
11.2 Welfare
11.2.1 Monopoly, low-t
In the low-price regime, the monopoly supplier sets a price that makes con-
sumers at the right end of the line indi¤erent between purchasing and not
purchasing a newspaper. Consumers whose preferences place them closer to
the left end of the line enjoy positive surplus if they buy. Consumer surplus
is the area of the shaded triangle in Figure 2,
1
2
t: (219)
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Figure 3: Consumer surplus, monopoly, high-t regime.
Economic prot generated by newspaper A in the low-t regime is ml1 =
z2  t F .21 Adapting equation (11) to the present case, advertisersprot
in the low-price licensed-monopoly regime is
1
2
nAR
 
1  A2 = 1
2
z2: (220)
Net social welfare in the low-price regime is the sum of prots and con-
sumer surplus,
z2   t  F + 1
2
z2 +
1
2
t =
3
2
z2   1
2
t  F: (221)
11.2.2 Monopoly, high t
Consumer surplus in the high-t regime is the area of the triangle in Figure 3,
(na   pA)2
2t
: (222)
Substituting na = z and pAM = 12z (+ c  ), and using z =  +
  c gives
na   pA = 1
2
z2: (223)
21The amount of the license fee determines the division of this prot between rm A
and the syndicate; this division does not a¤ect net social welfare.
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Figure 4: Consumer surplus, duopoly, both rms licensed.
Then consumer surplus in the rm A monopoly, high-price regime is
1
2t
(na   pA)2 = 1
8t
z4: (224)
Economic prot from the operation of newspaper A in the high-price
regime is ml2 =
1
4t
z4   F . Advertisersprot is (using nAR = 12tz2)
1
2
nARz
2 =
1
4t
z4: (225)
Net social welfare in the high-t licensed-monopoly regime is
1
4t
z4   F + 1
4t
z4 +
1
8t
z4 =
5
8t
z4   F: (226)
11.2.3 Licensed-rm Duopoly
Net utility at either extreme of the line (the location for which transportation
cost is zero) is (omitting superscripts since we consider symmetric equilibrium
values)
na   p =
z   t+ (   c) z = z ( +   c)  t =
z2   t: (227)
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Net utility at the center of the line (transportation cost 1
2
t) is
na   p  1
2
t = z ( +   c)  t  1
2
t = z2   3
2
t: (228)
By the assumption that the market is covered, (121), we have assumed
(228) is nonnegative.
Consumer surplus is the shaded area shown in Figure 4, one-half of which
is Z 1=2
x=0
[na   (p+ tx)] dx =
Z 1=2
x=0
[(na   p)  tx] dx =
(na   p)x  1
2
tx2
1=2
x=0
= (na   p)

1
2

  1
2
t

1
2
2
: (229)
Total consumer surplus is twice (229),
na   p  t

1
2
2
= z2   t  1
4
t = z2   5
4
t: (230)
From equation (11), advertisersprots are
1
2
 
nAR + n
B
R

z2;
and in equilibrium for this model, nAR = n
B
R =
1
2
; hence advertisersequilib-
rium prots are
1
2
z2; (231)
Equilibrium net social welfare is the sum of the prots generated by the
two newspapers, advertisersprots, and consumer surplus,
2

1
2
t  F

+
1
2
z2 + z2   5
4
t
2

1
2
t  F

+
1
2
z2 + z2   5
4
t =
3
2
z2   1
4
t  2F: (232)
51
11.3 High-t
Here we show that Theorem 1 holds for the high-t case. The inequalities
max
 
dnlnl ; 
m
nl2; 
Bd
nl3

< 0  min  dll; ml2 ; Adl3  (233)
correspond to
max
(
1  
2
t;
1  
4t
z4;
1  
2t

(3 + ) t+ 2z2
3 + 5
2)
< F 
min
(
1
2
t;
1
4t
z4;
1 + 
2t

3 (1  ) t+ 4z2
3 + 5
2)
: (234)
As ! 1, (234) approaches
max (0; 0; 0) = 0 < F  min

1
2
t;
1
4t
z4;
1
4t
z4

: (235)
By subtraction,
1
4t
z4   1
2
t =
1
2t

1
2
z4   t2

=
1
2t

1p
2
z2   t

1p
2
z2 + t

; (236)
which is positive in the high-t case since
1p
2
z2   t > 2
3
z2   t  0: (237)
Then (235) reduces to (49). From this point, the argument is as for the
low-t, high- case.
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